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Zilibotti. 1 Introduction
The process of economic development and growth is a process of an endless introduction
of new technologies. This is especially true for the early times of industrial revolution but
also for today. When new technologies are introduced, their properties are not always well-
understood. While a technology might promise a very e¢ cient provision of a certain good,
the same technology could also have side-e⁄ects the inventor did not think o⁄. The history
of the introduction of new technologies is full of countless examples.
Coal was used as a source of energy at least since the Roman Empire. Systematic coal
mining, however, was not undertaken until the industrial revolution required a massive and
steady supply of energy. Coal seemed the perfect solution. Mining, however, has its side
e⁄ects. In 1831 a potential causal link between working in a coal mine and the black lung
disease was ￿rst reported by a Scottish physician. Nowadays, black lung disease is accepted
as a disease caused by repeated and year-long inhalation of small amounts of coal dust. It
took more than 130 years, however, until this link was generally accepted. Only in the
1960s, after extensive political activities of various worker groups in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
West Virginia on the Appalachian coal ￿elds, the black lung disease was recognized as an
occupational disease. As a consequence, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was passed
in 1969 implying more comprehensive rules on work conditions and also compensation of
disabled mine workers (Smith, 1987).
There is an abundance of further examples for health and safety implications of work,
including the ￿brown lung￿disease caused by exposure to cotton dust (Botsch, 1993), the
￿white lung￿disease caused inter alia by mining and the exposure to asbestos (Rosner and
Markovitz, 1991), the health risk caused by radium (Clark, 1997), the spray machine con￿ ict
in the early 1900s (Frounfelker, 2006) or con￿ icts in the pottery industry (Stern, 2003). For
an overview of the literature on the history of occupational health and safety (OHS), see
Judkins (1986, p. 240).
A reading of these analyses reveals that side-e⁄ects of new ways of production only gradu-
ally become known. While there might be uncertainty about health implications of a certain
job, there is initially often simply ignorance about health implications, sometimes just ab-
sence of any doubt. When workers then start sensing that ￿something goes wrong￿ , that work
conditions cause health problems, these claims are often met with doubt, both by employers,
but also by insurance companies or even the government. These analyses also make clear
that worker movements, joint collective actions of individuals, are required to raise political
awareness, to lobby for changes in work conditions and to eventually have regulatory changes
towards more OHS measures implemented.
Similar conclusions about the importance of worker movements to spark o⁄ broader sup-
port not only for improved working conditions but also for the development of the modern
welfare state can be drawn by looking at Germany. During the industrial revolution around
1850, the issues of poverty, working and life conditions of dependent workers provoked the
2creation of organizations allowing the joint expression of the workers￿interests (see e.g. Schnei-
der, 2005, p. 15). While poverty and dependent work also existed in pre-industrial times, the
contemporaneous rise of wealthiness of some and poverty of others was no longer accepted
as ￿the will of God￿ . The ￿rst trade union in Germany, founded in June 1848 by type set-
ters, had as objective to secure the living standards of type setters fearing competition from
the steam engine and technological progress (hence, there was income orientation) but also
to build up mutual health and invalidity insurance systems (Schneider, 2005, p. 27). The
worker movement, represented by unions and political parties, was also spurred by occupa-
tional injuries which almost caused ￿mass-causalities￿(Tennstedt et al. 1993, p. XXI), partly
due to the widespread use of new technologies and fast economic growth. These movements
and associated political pressure caused Bismarck, the German chancellor, to put - inter alia
- statutory accident insurance in force in 1884.
The upshot of this discussion about historical episodes of advanced OECD countries is
threefold: (i) A safe work place, OHS in short, does not come for free: Achievements of the
modern welfare state which are taken for granted today were hotly disputed in the past. (ii)
There is a con￿ ict of interest between unions and ￿rms - which goes beyond pure wage bill
issues. In many cases, industry, insurance companies and often also the government initially
object to any demands for compensation or changes in health standards simply because there
is no clear scienti￿c medical evidence for the claimed nexus between certain symptoms and
the professional activity. (iii) Unions2 played a crucial role in pushing for OHS standards
and prepared and fought for what is (almost generally) accepted today as a positive aspect
of modern welfare states (see e.g. Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1), Agell (1999, p. F144)
and the discussion following below). Only once workers succeed in forming large groups and
in lobbying for their joint interests, there is enough political visibility such that changes in
OHS regulations take place. To put it short, in the spirit of Freeman and Medo⁄￿ s (1984)
￿collective voice￿ : Trade unions have a ￿good face￿as well.
The purpose of this paper is, ￿rst, to understand why it took worker movements (rather
than the government or employers) to start the development of insurance mechanisms, why
worker movements eventually led to the creation of government agencies which nowadays reg-
ulate OHS and what the determinants of endogenous OHS standards are. In a second part,
the paper looks at our global world today, taking a more normative approach. Nowadays,
OHS is hardly an issue in advanced OECD countries.3 Employees are protected against exces-
sive exposure to chemicals, there are radiation limits for medical personnel and for computer
users sitting in front of a screen or using wi-￿. Construction workers have to wear helmets
and are protected against falling by safety belts and regulations on how to construct scaf-
2We will often use ￿ union￿as short-cut for more informal worker groups, worker movements or worker
associations. Union, as used here, does not necessarily describe a well-organized and at times bureaucratic
huge institution as nowadays in some OECD countries.
3There is a lively literature on appropriateness of various OHS measures in ￿the North￿measuring costs
per statistical life and this is an important issue. We claim that OHS in developed countries today is hardly
an issue relative to historic standards (or developing countries).
3folds. But what about developing countries? There are considerable international di⁄erences
in occupational safety records. While in OECD countries the annual number of work-related
fatal accidents per 100.000 employees is estimated to lie around 4, occupational accident rates
rise up to 10 for India or China or even above 20 for other Asian countries or sub-saharan
Africa (H￿m￿l￿inen et al., 2006). Work conditions in many developing countries today re-
semble work conditions in OECD countries during the industrial revolution. When countries
compete with each other over international investments, do these di⁄erences constitute ￿un-
fair competition￿ ? Is there a risk that ￿globalization￿(think of international capital ￿ ows,
especially foreign direct investments) cuts back the welfare state? Will OHS standards in
the North have to fall? Condensing these issues and formulating them in an extreme way,
should a country abolish achievements of worker movements in the North and adjust to work
conditions in the South or should countries rather introduce or support worker movements in
the South?
We construct a model which highlights the key ingredients for understanding the impor-
tance of worker movements in the past. Jobs have two e⁄ects on workers - they provide
income and they a⁄ect health. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will
assume that workers are entirely ignorant about the health implications of jobs - job choice
is purely based on the wage paid by the employer. Returning to the coal miner example from
above, workers were simply not aware of the potential risk of the black lung disease.4 We
consider an economy with one homogenous good and assume perfect competition on goods
and labour markets implying inter alia full employment. Given the absence of any information
on health risk of working, the production process exerts a negative externality on workers￿
health. OHS standards can in principle reduce this negative externality but they also reduce
TFP of ￿rms, capturing the fact that OHS is costly. As long as health e⁄ects of working
are disputed, no employer or government would concede better working conditions. The role
of worker movements is to provide and con￿rm information about health-e⁄ects of working.
An individual worker does not have enough time and makes too few observations to discern
job-related health e⁄ects from other health e⁄ects. A group of workers, a union, has many
members and thereby more observations. Learning is much faster and unions can thereby help
internalize the externality. In standard trade union models, the objective of trade unions is
to maximize the wage income of their members. We extend this arguably narrow perspective
and portray trade unions as targeting both for high wage income and good health standards.
We then ￿nd determinants of OHS standards by letting unions set OHS standards. This
monopoly view of OHS-setting unions and employment-setting ￿rms is - as in wage-setting
models of unions - a short-cut to a more complete setup with endogenous union membership
where workers form groups to increase the speed of learning.
Moving the perspective from the past to our global world today, we consider a rich North
4We see this complete ignorance as a short-cut to a Bayesian learning setup where workers have a prior
about health implications and it takes time to learn the true health consequences of a job. See Viscusi (1979,
1980) for various applications of Bayesian learning to uncertainty about health implications of jobs.
4and a poor South. In addition to having more capital, the North has trade unions which
set OHS standards.5 There are (initially) no unions active in the South and OHS standards
are therefore low. We allow for free trade in the ￿nal homogenous good and capital and
analyze the e⁄ects on OHS standards in the North, on output and on welfare. Finally, we let
trade unions go global and analyze the e⁄ects of an increase in OHS standards in the South
on welfare of the North, of the South and of the world as a whole. We also study whether
northern trade unions approve of the activities of trade unions in the South.
Some of our ￿ndings are as follows: Each ￿rm individually is opposed to higher OHS stan-
dards as they reduce TFP and thereby pro￿ts. Unlike compensating di⁄erentials setups with
complete information, competitive markets here are unable to take health e⁄ects of technolo-
gies into account: individuals can not judge with su¢ ciently high precision to what extent a
certain job a⁄ects health. The laissez-faire factor allocation is characterized by ine¢ ciently
high sickness leaves. If better-informed ￿rm-level trade unions set OHS standards, the posi-
tive e⁄ect on more health of their members balances the negative e⁄ect of lower employment
due to lower TFP. If there are economy-wide or occupational unions, OHS standards are more
comprehensive as unions also take the negative health e⁄ect on overall labour supply into ac-
count. If unions are not too extreme in their health preferences, higher OHS standards than
those favoured by ￿rms increase economy-wide output and increase welfare. The presence of
unions is welfare-increasing.
Capital owners6 favour higher OHS standards than individual ￿rms. Capital owners see
that an economy-wide increase in health increases labour supply and thereby returns to cap-
ital owners - as long as the positive health e⁄ect is not overcompensated by the negative
TFP e⁄ect. Capital owners might even favour higher OHS standards than ￿rm-level unions!
Capital owners could never, however, be at the origin of improving work standards as they
simply do not feel (in the literal sense of the word) health e⁄ects. They have no incentive
to form ￿capitalists movements￿as bad working conditions do not a⁄ect them. When we
compare capital owners to economy-wide unions, unions desire higher OHS standards as they
value health per se (capital does not become sick but workers do). Hence, both at the ￿rm
level and at the economy-wide level there is con￿ ict of interest between unions on the one
hand and ￿rms and capital owners, respectively, on the other. But for some range of OHS,
unions and capital owners agree on increasing OHS standards. This explains why - after
some initial historical dispute and controversies over OHS standards - most OHS standards
in OECD countries are no longer hotly disputed today.
Turning to OHS determinants, they depend inter alia on the level of development of an
5Many advanced countries now have government institutions which regulate OHS standards (e.g. the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the US or the Health and Safety Executive in the UK).
When we talk about unions in the North, we think of the role unions played in the past. When we talk about
southern unions, we think more of the present. A dynamic version of our model with capital accumulation
and evolving institutions is left for future research.
6Capital owners here and in what follows denote of a federation of all capital owners in an economy.
Individuals looking only at capital income in one speci￿c ￿rm would never agree on higher OHS standards.
5economy, i.e. here on the capital per worker endowment. When health and income are bad
substitutes, union OHS standards - and also those of a planner - increase in the development
level of an economy. Hence, there are no ￿universal labour standards￿that apply to each
country at each point in time.
In a global world, capital out￿ ows to the South are the lower, the closer OHS standards
in the North are to the interest rate maximizing level, i.e. the OHS level favoured by capital
owners. Capital ￿ ows from the North to the South per se are generally welfare improving.
As capital ￿ ows reduce wage income of workers, trade unions react to out￿ ows by reducing
northern work standards. When OHS standards in the North prior to capital ￿ ows are lower
than (or equal to) the socially optimal standards, this reduction in OHS standards reduces
the welfare gains in the North from opening up to trade.
When trade unions are introduced in the South and the southern OHS standards rise,
average health in the South increases while TFP of ￿rms is reduced. To the extent that this
OHS increase is not too large, marginal productivity of capital in the South goes up and
makes the South more attractive for investors. Higher standards in the South therefore imply
an increase in capital ￿ ows towards the South - capital does not go to where standards are
lowest. The welfare e⁄ects in the North now generally look bleak: Additional capital out￿ ows
reduce welfare, the implied reduction in OHS standards as well. The South pro￿ts from higher
standards and world welfare also tends to rise. Trade unions in the North, however, do not
appreciate higher standards in the South as capital out￿ ow reduces wages and northern OHS
standards. This lowers welfare of northern trade union members. Given that unions in the
South unambiguously gain, there is a clear con￿ ict of interests between northern and southern
unions. To put it simple, global trade unions are a good idea - but not for trade unions in
the North! Fortunately, a quantitative analysis shows that losses in the North are very small
and overcompensated by gains in the South.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. First, there is a policy-oriented
discussion on labour standards and the e⁄ect of globalization7. Srinivasan (1996, 1998) shows
that endogenous labour standards will naturally di⁄er between countries with di⁄erent levels
of development - as we ￿nd in our analysis - and that diversity in labour standards is not
an argument against free trade. He also states that labour standards might not be provided
e¢ ciently in the presence of some market failures. Brown, Deardor⁄ and Stern (1996, 1998)
provide a broad overview and argue inter alia that in the case of market failures, minimum
safety standards do not automatically restore Pareto optimality. For an international trade
7This literature in turn builds on more micro-oriented analyses of risk and regulation of which labour
standards are an example. An early survey of research on labour standards is by Dickens (1984). An excellent
recent introduction and overview is by Viscusi (2007).
6setup, universal labour standards will not internalize country-speci￿c ine¢ ciencies. We will
extend their arguments and focus more strongly on the issue of ine¢ ciencies and internaliza-
tion. Elliot and Freeman (2003) are more favourable to including labour standards into WTO
trading rules. Maskus (2004) in his discussion agrees that ￿individual enterprise owners can
gain from weak labor rights [...] even if the economy is generally harmed￿ . This is exactly our
starting point and the fundamental assumption we build into our model.
Second, there is an obviously huge literature on trade unions, and it would be impossible to
provide a summary here which does any justice to the various substrands. While it seems fair
to argue that most contributions attribute a distorting (e¢ ciency-reducing) role to unions8,
there are also quite some economists that ￿nd positive aspects in union behaviour: Brugiavini
et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1) see unions as the precursor of the modern welfare state. They write on
p.163 that ￿unions developed mutual insurance as part of associational self-help to compensate
for the lack of private insurance or public social protection. At the same time, they mobilized
[...] for the expansion of social rights. Increasingly, many of the protective functions that
unions provided [...] came to be taken over by the state￿ .9 A by now well-accepted argument
was made by Freeman and Medo⁄￿ s (1984): By providing a ￿collective voice￿ , unions provide
information which otherwise would not be available. Malcomson (1983) argues that unions
increase e¢ ciency as they improve the allocation of risk-bearing between ￿rms and workers.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that unions induce training and provide insurance and Boeri
and Burda (2008) show that workers prefer collective bargaining in the presence of market
imperfections. Booth (1995, ch. 3.3) discusses e¢ ciency increasing e⁄ects of unions and Agell
(1999, p. F144), more generally, argues that ￿certain institutions may serve quite useful
purposes￿in the labour market. We provide OHS standards as an example of such a useful
institution. We believe that this bene￿cial historical aspect of worker movements for nowadays
modern societies and the role unions can play in developing countries today has not received
su¢ cient credit so far. Our contribution lies in the emphasis and analysis, in the framework
of a very simple model, of the informational and learning advantage of a union in a world
with incomplete information and side-e⁄ects of new technologies.
Maybe most importantly, our view of multi-feature work places is related to but di⁄ers
starkly from the equalizing di⁄erences approach of Rosen (1974, 1986). Equalizing di⁄erences
are traditionally derived in setups with perfect information. When workers know about all job
characteristics and all markets are competitive, factor allocation is e¢ cient and any institution
would be distorting. Given the historical situation and technological examples we have in
mind, perfect information on the side of workers does not appear to be a realistic assumption.
8Distortions can have their positive sides in second best worlds or when it comes to collecting rents. See
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) for an example with an employment-oriented union in an international trade
setup with imperfect competition.
9Historical evidence linking union growth to their provision of insurance (strikes, unemployment, sickness,
burial cost) for the Netherlands and Britain is provided by van Leeuwen (1997). Quantitative evidence for
the United States for union decline due to an expanding welfare state is provided by Neumann and Rissman
(1984).
7We therefore choose the other extreme and assume that workers are unable to learn anything
about work-related health implications. While reality certainly lies inbetween, the justi￿cation
for our assumption is simple: When new technologies become available, workers and often
society as a whole does not know a lot about potential side-e⁄ects. Health implications can be
very long-term and workers might simply not have the time to learn about these implications.
Hence, abstracting from learning processes which take a very long time, we assume right
away that learning by individual workers is impossible. As a consequence, decentralized
factor allocation is ine¢ cient. Trade unions, by contrast, consisting of a large number of
workers, have access to many observations about jobs, can collect this information and can
therefore learn more easily. In fact, we assume that unions have perfect information and can
therefore internalize externalities, increase e¢ ciency, output and welfare.
Finally, the rapidly growing literature on child labour touches upon some aspects covered
also here. For example, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) analyse how attitudes towards child
labour regulation can change over time. Baland and Robinson (2000) derive determinants
of child labour and generally ￿nd that child labour is ine¢ cient. In contrast, Krueger and
Donohue (2005) ￿nd that a child-labour ban is not necessarily welfare increasing. To the
extent that child labour is bad for health and safety of children, our analysis implicitly studies
the e⁄ects of trade unions and globalization on child labour. In fact, Doepke and Zilibotti
(2005, p. 1494) mention that the ￿trade union movement played a key role in lobbying for
the introduction of child labour regulation￿ . Baland and Robinson (2000, footnote 17) make
a similar point. This literature, however, does not focus on unions as an institution as we do
here and does not attempt to work out the potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects unions and their use
of their market power can have.
3 Occupational health and safety in a closed economy
3.1 The model
Our economy produces a homogenous good. Aggregate output amounts to Y . A typical ￿rm
produces the quantity y by using a technology with total factor productivity (TFP) A(￿) and
by employing capital k and labour l, the latter of which is measured in working hours. All
￿rms use the same technology which is is given by
y = A(s)f (k;l); (1)
where capital and labour inputs have the usual neoclassical e⁄ects on output. Given our
historical perspective on what are now OECD countries or our focus on developing countries
today, we assume that ￿rms can hire from a spot market. There are no hiring or ￿ring costs
and it does not take any time to ￿nd a worker.
The central focus of this paper is OHS. This aspect is re￿ ected in the production process in
the TFP component A(s). TFP in a ￿rm or in a country is in￿ uenced by many factors starting
8from very technology-speci￿c aspects (like the age distribution of the capital stock or the
management and communication skills of sta⁄) and going to more economy-wide in￿ uences
(like the institutional stability, the political regime, or the education level of workers). The
more important factor in￿ uencing TFP for our arguments is OHS s. A job is safe(r) if a
worker or employee is (more) certain to return home in good health after 8 (or more) hours
of work. We capture safer jobs by a higher s > 0:
Safe workplaces are clearly in the interest of the worker, and in many cases, OHS is also
a central concern for employers. If safety measures increase the smoothness of a production
process, employers should be in favour of high safety standards. An accident in a coal mine
costing not only lifes of workers but also letting the production process break down for weeks is
clearly not in the interest of the ￿rm. In many cases, however, there is a fundamental con￿ ict
of interest. In the case of low-skill workers or workers needing only general (i.e. not ￿rm-
speci￿c) human capital to perform their job and in countries where ￿rms do not (have to) pay
sickness-leave (i.e. whenever ￿rms can easily replace their workers), ￿rms have no economic
interest in the state of health of their workers. Quite to the contrary, OHS measures are
costly. A workplace where coal miners are well protected against the black lung disease or ore
miners against silicosis is more costly than one without protection measures like ventilation
systems. A worker who spends half an hour on dressing and undressing (helmets, safety
glasses, gloves, entire suits etc.) is less productive than a worker who starts doing his job
right away. We capture these costs by letting OHS measures reduce total factor productivity,
As < 0.10 Given the spot market assumption, a sick worker would simply be replaced by a
new healthy worker.
An individual values consumption c and health z and both are determined by the job an
individual chooses. A job is therefore a di⁄erentiated good as in Rosen (1974). Let z (s;m)
denote the share of potential working hours that an individual is healthy and can work. Currie
and Madrian (1999) summarize the literature on health and labour markets. They document
a positive relationship between health and income with larger e⁄ects of health on hours than
on wages. While it is true that the link between health and labour market participation is less
clear-cut (Currie and Madrian stress that this could be due to an abundance of methodological
problems), we feel safe to assume in what follows that longer working hours m under bad OHS
standards are bad for health, zm < 0; but safety measures s improve health, zs > 0. Utility
of workers increases in consumption c and health z (s;m) but with a decreasing slope, uc > 0,
ucc < 0 and uz > 0, uzz < 0. Letting all individuals work the same number of hours m, we
can suppress m and use
u = u(c;z (s)) (2)
as utility function. Health is important for two reasons: It matters per se and consumption
rises due to longer hours worked. All workers are identical in their preferences.
10This is the standard assumption in the literature on compensating di⁄erentials, see e.g. Rosen (1986). If
A increased in s; no uncertain jobs would every be observed. One can always imagine that A initially increases
in s but decreases above some threshold level.
9On the aggregate level, consumption equals output C = Y and labour demand L equals
labour supply,
L = z (s)N: (3)
The latter is given by potential employment N (also measured in hours and assumed to be
￿x) times the share z (s) of time workers are healthy and can actually work. More safety,
implying more health, implies higher labour supply.
We ￿nally turn to trade unions. Depending on the degree of centralization of the nego-
tiations and wage setting, the literature usually classi￿es countries in three groups (see e.g.
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988): (1) highly decentralized systems with wage setting at the ￿rm
level (i.e. USA and Canada), (2) intermediate degree of centralization (most continental Eu-
ropean countries), and (3) highly centralized systems with wage setting at the national level
(i.e. Nordic countries and Austria). We will also consider di⁄erent degrees of centralization
and model the two polar cases of highly decentralized and a highly centralized systems.
In a decentralized setup, unions operate at the ￿rm level and are therefore small relative
to the economy as a whole. As we view spot markets as the best description of labour
markets for activities as described in the introduction, there is no attachment of workers to
the ￿rm. Hence, membership of ￿rm-level unions is just as volatile as employment at the
￿rm. As a consequence, the union only cares about the overall well-being of the l workers in
this particular ￿rm. As households value consumption and health, we let unions value these
quantities as well. Consumption depends on capital and labour income and union members
might also have some capital income. Observing union activities, however, we ￿nd it more
appropriate to model unions as institutions which focus on labour income or the employment
situation in general. Unions neglect the capital market position of their members and focus
on the wage sum of their members. Given historical examples about union behaviour in now
OECD countries and preferences of households in (2), unions also care about a worker￿ s health
and a union￿ s utility function reads
v = v (wl;z (s)); vwl > 0; vz > 0: (4)
Labour income wl of union members depends on the market wage w and on labour demand l
as chosen by the ￿rm. Depending on the importance attached to each of these two objectives,
the union might be called income-oriented or health-oriented.11
In some countries, unions are large or form a confederation. Their basic objectives are the
same but they now represent not only the workers of a particular ￿rm but the whole labour
force,
V = V (wL;z (s)); VwL > 0; Vz > 0: (5)
11For an introduction to the discussion on the appropriate speci￿cation of union preferences, see Oswald
(1982) and Booth (1995, ch. 4). Note that even for modern Britain, there is evidence that physical working
conditions is one important issue over which trade unions and management bargain (Millward et al., 1992,
pp. 249-254).
10The main di⁄erence to the ￿rm-level union is that health now has two positive channels,
as in individual preferences (2): health matters per se and through higher labour supply
visible here through L. An alternative idea to economy-wide unions, also captured by (5),
are occupation-speci￿c unions. As long as a union takes the e⁄ect of standards on all workers
into account (e.g. because a union represents all coal miners and not just those currently
employed in one particular ￿rm), bene￿cial labour supply e⁄ects through higher standards
are internalized by the union.
3.2 Centralized and decentralized OHS setting
This section explores the behaviour of a planner and OHS levels in a decentralized economy.
This allows us to understand the basic mechanism why trade unions in principle can have
positive welfare and output e⁄ects.
￿ The planner
As all ￿rms use the same technologies, we can simply insert aggregate capital endowment
K into (1). After having inserted also the labour-market equilibrium condition (3), total
output is given by
Y (s) = A(s)f (K;z (s)N): (6)
Welfare comparisons require a social welfare function. As our static framework is agnostic
about wealth distributions and preferences of households are identical, we use the individual
utility function (2) and insert aggregate consumption. With homogenous ￿rms, all workers
will be equally healthy and we obtain
U (s) = U (C (s);z (s)) = U (Y (s);z (s)): (7)
A social planner maximizing social welfare (7) chooses a safety level sU that satis￿es (see
app. A.1)
"UY"Y A"As = ["UY"Y L + "Uz]"zs; (8)
where for readability all elasticities throughout this paper are de￿ned as positive quantities.
Hence, the OHS elasticity of TFP and the inverse wage elasticity of labour demand require a











for ad = 2 fAs; wLg: (9)
Condition (8) balances welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing e⁄ects of more safety. The
left-hand side captures the cost of more safety caused by a lower TFP: A one-percentage in-
crease in the safety level reduces the TFP and thereby output by "Y A"As percent. Multiplying
this with the output elasticity of welfare, "UY, yields the percentage reduction in welfare. For
11maximum welfare, this negative e⁄ect of more safety has to be equal to the positive e⁄ect on
the right-hand side. A one-percentage increase in safety increases the share of time working
by "zs percent. This gives, multiplied by "Uz and by "UY"Y L respectively, the percentage
increase in utility due to better health and due to higher income.
If the planner focused only on output maximization (that is, if "Uz = 0), the optimality
condition giving the output-maximizing safety level sY would read
"Y A"As = "Y L"zs: (10)
This condition balances the output-decreasing e⁄ect on the left-hand side with the output-
increasing e⁄ect on the right-hand side. Interestingly, one can prove that for the general
production function in (6) the welfare-maximizing safety level is always higher than the
output-maximizing safety level, sU > sY.12
￿ The decentralized economy
The standard view to a setup with multiple job characteristics is the equalizing-di⁄erences
approach of Rosen (1974, 1986). According to this approach, workers enjoy (or dislike) job
characteristics in addition to the wage and a worker￿ s utility function would look like the one
we use in (2). The di⁄erence to our approach consists in the criteria for choosing a job. In the
equalizing-di⁄erences approach, workers have full information about job characteristics and
the choice of jobs would depend both on health implications z (s) and on income leading to a
consumption level c: Firms can therefore choose wage-safety pairs on a worker￿ s indi⁄erence
curve. The resulting market equilibrium would be e¢ cient.
The crucial di⁄erence of our approach lies in our historical perspective of unions in nowa-
days OECD countries and the conclusions we draw about information. Workers do not have
su¢ cient information (neither would society as a whole have) to perfectly evaluate the impact
of work, a certain job or a speci￿c technology on health. Workers could form expectations but
their expectations need to be - absent perfect information - based on a prior in a Bayesian
learning sense. Perfectly competitive ￿rms taking a safety-wage trade-o⁄ into account would
then set an ine¢ cient safety level if the prior is not identical to the true distribution of the
health impact of a job. When on the job, workers would of course gradually learn about
health implications of work, but each single worker makes just a few observations, especially
when health also depends on other factors than just work and certain health impacts come
with a long delay or can not easily be observed (as the examples in the introduction have
shown). There is simply not enough variation, econometrically speaking, there are not suf-
￿ciently many observations to draw ￿rm conclusions and learning can take more than a life
12Intuitively, the proof (see app. C.1) runs as follows: Let s maximize output in (6). Now add health to
this objective function and obtain (7). As the health term monotonously increases in s; a somewhat higher
health level is better as a marginal increases in health does not reduce output at s = sY but it does increase
the health term. Hence, sU > sY : Clearly, how much sU exceeds sY depends on how strongly health is valued,
how strongly health increases and how fast output drops when s increases.
12time. To capture this idea in the simplest possible way, we assume here that workers choose
employment based only on the wage and ￿rms choose employment taking the wage rate as
given. This will qualitatively imply the same type of ine¢ ciency one would observe in a
Bayesian setup (as employed e.g. by Viscusi, 1979, 1980). The advantage of this shortcut is
clearly the much simpler analytical tractability.
Given this focus of workers on wages (and capital owners on returns), optimal ￿rm be-
haviour yields the familiar equality between marginal productivities and factor rewards (sub-
scripts denote partial derivatives),
w = A(s)fl (k;l); r = A(s)fk (k;l): (11)
In a laissez-faire economy, a ￿rm ￿xes, in addition to the stock of labour and capital, the
safety level s: The derivative of pro￿ts with respect to the safety level is d￿=ds = As; i.e. it
is negative. Firms only see the TFP-reducing impact of more safety. As a consequence, ￿rms
would like OHS standards to be as low as possible.13 The comparison point to the central
planner solution sU or sY is a laissez-faire safety level of s￿: Given that we exclude negative
safety levels, we can set s￿ to zero. The resulting equilibrium is clearly ine¢ cient.
￿ Capital owners
It is interesting to contrast this ￿rm safety level to one which would be set by a federation
uniting all capital owners in an economy. At the country level, the safety level sR that
maximizes capital income r(s)K of all capital owners is described by (see app. A.5)
"rA"As = "rL"zs; (12)
where again the elasticities are de￿ned as in (9). Here, capital holders do not only consider
the TFP-reducing impact (on the left) but also the health-increasing impact (on the right) of
more safety. The reason for this is that interest rates depend on output, and, as we already
saw, output can be increased by increasing the workers￿health in a country.
The safety di⁄erences between the planner, the ￿rms and capital owners highlights the
externality caused by the production process. If the planner focused on TFP only, as does
each ￿rm, OHS s would be as low as possible since this increases output (6). A low safety
level, however, decreases the share z (s) of time a worker is healthy and can work. This
reduces aggregate labour supply z (s)N and therefore output (6). Hence, the starting point
of our analysis of the e⁄ects of union activity is a second-best world where production exerts
a negative externality on health. Output in a laissez-faire economy is ine¢ ciently low and
adding an institution - a union in our case - that sets OHS standards can improve e¢ ciency.
13The same would be true for small ￿entrepreneurs￿who invest in their own ￿rm. Someone owning k in
a ￿rm and computing the safety level which maximizes rk would also ￿nd that it is optimal to reduce s as
much as possible.
133.3 Endogenous OHS with trade unions
The previous section explored the e⁄ects of the negative production externality. We will now
show that if trade unions are introduced, the distorting e⁄ect can be reduced or even elimi-
nated. Why does the union have the knowledge and means required to do so? There are two
reasons: First, unions have many members and the more members there are, the easier it is
to learn about a job situation. Due to its size, the union can collect information more easily
than individuals. Second, in contrast to a loose group of workers having no institutional con-
nection, unions have the means to ￿prove￿the link between bad work conditions and health.
They can more easily monitor the credibility of individual claims about work conditions14
and they also have the power to impose better working conditions. Unions are a means to
overcome the information and credibility problem of individual workers.15
We will ￿rst analyse the principles of optimal union behaviour in a general setup. We
compare the implied safety levels with those optimal for capital owners. This allows us to
see under which conditions and to which extent there is a con￿ ict of interest between unions
and capital owners. We will then look at various examples (with Cobb-Douglas (CD) and
CES production and utility functions) to reveal the precise determinants of welfare gains and
potential con￿ icting of interests. This will show the potential but also the limits of union
activity on social welfare. We will consider a decentralized system (￿rm-level unions) and a
centralized system (trade union confederation).
3.3.1 The general case
￿ Firm-level unions
In basically all OECD countries, today and in the past, unionised and non-unionised sec-
tors coexist. Union densities change over time and sometimes unionized ￿rms compete with
non-unionized ￿rms. Various explanations can be o⁄ered for both coexistence and varying
union densities. In a competitive setup ￿ la Rosen with heterogenous ￿rms one can imagine
that ￿rms o⁄ering the more dangerous jobs are unionised while others are not. In the theo-
retical literature on ￿deunionisation￿ , Acemoglu et al. (2001) show how biased technological
change can be the reason for both deunionisation and an increase in wage inequality. In their
setup, workers have an explicit choice whether to unionize or not.
We abstract from these important issues as we want to contrast our approach to the
canonical model of trade unions. In the traditional monopoly union model (see Dunlop,
1944, Oswald, 1982), unions set the wage, ￿rms choose employment and unemployment is
14The importance of unions to alleviate moral hazard problems has already been stressed by Beveridge in
1909 (quote taken from van Leeuwen, 1997, p. 786). Beveridge claims that unions of his time were in the
best position to monitor the appropriate use of unemployment bene￿t payments.
15Firms can also learn faster than individual workers as a ￿rm hires many workers. Once the ￿rm has
learned about negative health e⁄ects of a certain technology, however, it might not be in the ￿rm￿ s interest
to reveal its information as workers with health problems incurred in the past could then ￿le claims.
14the ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome. We give unions market power as well, assuming that it is
bene￿cial for workers to join a union and that unions succeed in learning better than workers
about the work-health link and in solving the monitoring problem. This is our extreme short-
cut to describing historical processes. Historically, worker movements do not have any market
power when they start. Political parties are often the vehicle through which public attention
and support increase. If new regulations then improve OHS standards, they are put into force
by the government. Indirectly, however, these new regulations are set by worker movements
and this is what we capture here. Unions use their market power not to set wages - as in the
traditional model - but to set the safety level s. While unions in the real world are concerned
with several issues of which wage negotiation is an important one, we focus here entirely on
union activities related to improving work conditions as described in the introduction. Wages
are perfectly ￿ exible in our setup and there is no unemployment.
At the ￿rm level, employment l in the union￿ s objective function (4) is given by the ￿rm￿ s
labour demand from (11) which through TFP is a function of the safety level, l = l(A(s)).
The wage rate w and the ￿rm￿ s capital stock k in the labour demand function l(￿) are taken as
parametric by the union. The choice of the safety level sv is perceived by the union to a⁄ect
labour demand through TFP and health z (s). Assuming an interior solution, the ￿rst-order
condition of maximizing (4) subject to l = l(A(s)) is given with (9) by (see app. A.3)
"vwl"lA"As = "vz"zs: (13)
As in the planner￿ s trade-o⁄, safety here also has a positive and a negative e⁄ect. The
negative e⁄ect on the left-hand side comes through the reduction in labour demand by the
￿rm as a result of the cost associated with a higher safety: A one-percentage increase of
safety decreases TFP by "As percent and the labour demand by "lA"As percent. Multiplying
this with "vwl gives the percentage reduction in utility. The positive e⁄ect on the right-hand
side is the direct e⁄ect of more health on utility: A one-percentage increase in the safety level
increases health by "zs percent which multiplied by "vz gives the percentage increase in utility.
The di⁄erences between the union￿ s optimal sv from (13) and the planner￿ s sU from (8)
stem from three sources: First, the union might value health di⁄erently than the central
planner, i.e. v (￿) might di⁄er from U (￿). In fact, the union might value health more (i.e. "vz
might be greater than "Uz) since all workers are a⁄ected by workplace conditions while not all
consumers are, as some consumers might live on capital income only. Second, the union cares
about labour income wl only and not about total consumption C. In other words, capital
income of capital owners is not taken into account. Third, maybe most surprisingly, ￿rm-level
unions without ￿xed membership do not take into account the positive e⁄ect of an increased
health on the labour supply and thereby on output, the "UY"Y L"zs term in (8).
￿ The trade union confederation
The union confederation has the same objectives as the ￿rm-level union even though it
represents not only the workers from a particular ￿rm but the whole labour force. Con-
sequently, employment in the union confederation￿ s objective function (5) is economy-wide
15labour supply L = z
￿
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: The safety level set by the confederation is denoted by sV. The
optimality condition is (see app. A.4), using again (9),
"V wL"wA"As = ["V wL [1 ￿ "wL] + "V z]"zs; (14)
The optimality condition (14) again balances the positive and negative e⁄ects of a higher safety
level. In contrast to the ￿rm-level union, however, the union confederation does take into
account the positive e⁄ect of an increased health on the labour supply, the "V wL [1 ￿ "wL]"zs
term. In fact, condition (14) has more in common with the welfare-maximizing condition in
(8) than with (13). Comparing (8) and (14) makes clear that health per se has a similar
impact on both conditions, the terms "Uz"zs and "V z"zs. However, the main di⁄erence resides
in the fact that the union confederation is only interested in the workers￿income, wL, while
the central planner considers the whole income, that is, the income of workers and of capital
holders: Y = wL + rK.
3.3.2 An example
While intuitive, the ￿rst-order conditions of the planner, the unions or capital owners might
not be satis￿ed. The positive e⁄ect of more health could always be stronger than the negative
e⁄ect of a lower TFP - or vice versa. The conditions also reveal little about the central
determinants of health and safety levels. We therefore now look at a speci￿c example in
which a unique optimum can be easily identi￿ed and the con￿ ict of interest in our economy
can be studied.
￿ Functional forms
Assume a CES form for utility functions with arguments income and health. The house-
hold utility function in (2) and the ￿rm-level union￿ s objective function in (4) are thus assumed















where 0 < ￿;￿ < 1 and ￿ < 1. The confederation￿ s utility in (5) and our example for the















16Let there be a CD production function at the ￿rm level and therefore also on aggregate with







Health is captured in all utility functions by z (s) with a weight of ￿ for the households
and the central planner and a corresponding weight ￿ for unions. Unions might value health
di⁄erently than ￿normal￿households as all union members are subject to health e⁄ects of
working while households also include capital owners which are not exposed to health hazards.
Likewise, income at the household or planner level is all income and can therefore be expressed
by individual consumption c or aggregate output Y: Income taken into account by unions is
labour income only, i.e. wl or wL: In all cases, the elasticity of substitution between income
and health is given by 1=(1 ￿ ￿). For ￿ ! 0, the CES functions (15) to (18) become CD
functions, e.g. u = c￿z (s)
1￿￿ and v = [wl]
￿ z (s)
1￿￿ for (15) and (16).
Finally, let us choose functional forms for TFP and the share of time being healthy as
related to OHS which have the properties discussed after (1) and (3),
A(s) = be
￿￿s; z (s) = 1 ￿ ￿ qe
￿￿s; (21)
where b, ￿ and ￿ are positive constants. When s is very low, TFP is close to its maximum
b and the share of healthy hours is close to its minimum 1 ￿ ￿ q. Restricting ￿ q to take values
between zero and one, zero safety measures still imply that workers are on average healthy
during 1 ￿ ￿ q percent of the time. The higher s is, the closer TFP is to zero and the higher
the average health z (s) is.
￿ Optimal safety levels
The existence of optimal safety levels follows from computing ￿rst-order conditions and
checking the sign of the ￿rst derivative to the left and right of the optimum in general equi-
librium. A general equilibrium perspective has been taken for the maximization procedure
by economy-wide institutions (the planner and the nation-wide union). Firm-level unions
compute their optimal safety level given the ￿rm￿ s labour demand function. We take these
optimality conditions and replace ￿rm variables (like the capital stock k) by aggregate vari-
ables adopting the standard symmetric equilibrium view with many identical unions.
Table 1 presents ￿rst-order conditions for CES utility functions (15) to (18) and corre-
sponding CD results for ￿ ! 0, i.e. the safety levels for the welfare-maximizing and the
output-maximizing planner and for both types of unions (see app. B.4).
The safety level sY in (b) chosen by a planner who maximizes output only (i.e. ￿ = 1 in
(18)) is positive if the term in squared brackets is larger than one, (1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=￿) ￿ q > 1:
Given that ￿ q is the share of time sick, this expression is larger than one only for a su¢ ciently
small ￿ or ￿ or a large ￿: A small ￿ implies a high output elasticity of labour. A planner
17will therefore provide more safety when this has a stronger positive e⁄ect on output. When
￿ is small, the cost of safety on TFP by (21) is not so strong and a planner will also provide
more safety. Similarly with ￿ : More safety, again by (21), increases health and labour supply
strongly and the planner is induced to provide more safety. Let us assume that parameters










































































Table 1 Optimal occupational health and safety levels for (19) to (21)
When looking at the signs of the ￿rst and second derivatives, one ￿nds that sY is an
optimum indeed and one obtains an ￿inverted U￿shape for Y (s) from (20) as illustrated in
￿g. 1. To the right of sY; the positive e⁄ect of an increase in the safety level on health and
thereby labour supply overcompensates the negative e⁄ect of lower TFP. This reverses to the
left of sY.
The other expressions in table 1 are implicit for the CES utility functions, as the elasticities
"(￿) are functions of the safety levels. We will return to these forms further below. For the
CD case, we also obtain straightforward solutions which can be given similar interpretations
as for the output-maximizing safety level. The additional factor in (a), (c) and (d) are the
preference parameters ￿ and ￿: When health is valued strongly, i.e. ￿ and ￿ are low, the
welfare, ￿rm-level union or confederation safety levels, as expected, go up. Again, looking
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Figure 1 Output and welfare as a function of occupational health and safety s
￿ Con￿ ict of interests?
Who wants what in our economy? Given the richness of channels visible in the CD-results
of table 1, we make a weak assumption concerning parameters which allows us to focus on the
most realistic con￿ icts of interest: ￿ < ￿ < ￿. The output elasticity of capital, ￿; is around
1=3: When comparing this to ￿; the value attached by unions to labour income in (16) and
(17), our assumption says that unions, even though they are health oriented, the weight they
attach to labour income is at least 1=3: The second part of the assumption says that union
values health more than society as a whole, ￿ < ￿: This also appears plausible as members
of unions are all subject to health risks while society also consists of capital owners who are
not.
Our economy is populated by the planner, the unions and the capital owners. The planner
can appear either in its welfare or in its output-maximizing guise, unions and capital owners
are both represented at the ￿rm and the nation-wide level. With our assumption and CD








The output-maximizing planner and the capital owners agree on the safety level, sR = sY:
What maximizes output maximizes capital income rK, clearly a property of the CD structure
of output in (20). The welfare-maximizing planner wants a higher safety level than the output
planner, sY < sU; see fn. 12.
Nation-wide unions desire a higher OHS level than the welfare planner due to ￿ < ￿.
Nation-wide unions value health more than society as a whole. In fact, if society and nation-
wide unions had identical preferences, unions could replace here the role of the central planner.
They would internalize the production externality and would set the welfare-maximizing safety
level.
When looking at capital and labour representatives at the ￿rm level, we know already
from the discussion after (11) that ￿rms want the lowest possible safety level s￿. Concerning
19unions, we ￿nd a surprising result: Firm-level unions want a lower safety level sv than capital
owners or a central planner who is purely interested in output maximization. The reason is
that the central planner (and the capital owners) know about (and internalize) the bene￿ts
of more health for labour supply. The ￿rm-level union sees positive e⁄ects from higher OHS
standards only in its pure health e⁄ect and neglects labour supply e⁄ects (in fact, it looks at
labour l in its objective function as the labour demand by ￿rms which falls as TFP falls as a
result of higher safety).16
Summarizing, the nation-wide union, given its ￿exaggerated￿ emphasis on health is in
con￿ ict with society as a whole which in turn wants higher OHS standards than output-
maximizers and capital owners. The lowest safety providers are ￿rm-owners and ￿rm-level
unions.17 Comparing union output and welfare with a laissez-faire economy is straightforward
when using ￿g. 1. Unions are welfare or output increasing if the safety level they set is to the
left of sY and sU, respectively. If they ￿overdo things￿ , i.e. if the union safety level is too far
to the right of sY or sU; they would still be bene￿cial to the economy if the negative e⁄ect on
TFP is not too strong, i.e. if the decrease of output and welfare to the right of their maxima
is modest. For illustration purposes, the ranking in (22) is also plotted in ￿g. 1.
3.3.3 OHS and development
Empirical analysis suggests (Hall and Leeson, 2007) a negative correlation between the devel-
opment level of a country and the risk of injury while working. Should this give rise to policy
concerns or is this a feature of an e¢ cient development process?
Using the implicit-function theorem on CES safety levels as presented in table 1 shows
that the reaction depends on the elasticity of substitution between income (wl for the ￿rm-

























Both the planner and the two types of unions would set a higher safety level if the elasticity
of substitution between health and income is low. This can be understood by recurring to the
income and substitution e⁄ect. There is an income e⁄ect due to more capital which increases
demand for health z (s) and consumption, the two arguments in the planner￿ s utility function
in (7). The price of health relative to consumption, however, rises the more capital there is
and households tend to substitute health by income.
16Departing from our parameter assumption would imply that a ￿rm-level union sets a higher safety level
than a central output-planner if it only values health enough. App. C.2 shows that sv Q sY , ￿ Q ￿:
17Again, departing from our assumption on parameters, one can show that for ￿ = ￿￿ the ￿rm-level union
would set the same safety level as a planner sv = sU (see app. C.2).
20In the CD case these e⁄ects cancel. Safety levels do not change in the course of development
of a country. This would be the ￿universal work standard￿ case advocated by some who
postulate that all countries in the world, irrespective of their level of development, should
have the same OHS standards. When substitution is easy, it is not clear which e⁄ect is
stronger. In this case, health standards could even go down when a country becomes richer.
The substitution e⁄ect would dominate the income e⁄ect.
The case that seems to be empirically more relevant is the one in which work standards
are higher, the higher the development level of a country is (Hall and Leeson, 2007). This is
the bad substitution case (￿ < 0) in our model. When a society becomes richer, it can a⁄ord
more health and as income is a bad substitute for health, OHS standards go up accepting that
this reduces TFP and therefore dampens the increase in income. Our view that the positive
link between development and OHS standards is also due to unions is also shared by Kahn
(1990, p.481) who writes that ￿union workers implicitly trade o⁄wage and bene￿ts growth for
occupational safety improvements￿ . In what follows, we will stick to this empirically plausible
assumption that health and income are bad substitutes.
4 OHS under trade and capital ￿ ows
This section now takes a more global perspective on OHS standards. We will analyse a two-
country world in order to understand the e⁄ects of ￿globalization￿(i.e. international capital
￿ ows) on safety standards and thereby on output and welfare.
4.1 Capital ￿ ows in a two-country world
￿ Equilibrium
Let there be a country which we call ￿the North￿ with institutions as just described.
This country can undertake FDI and trade the ￿nal homogeneous good with ￿the South￿ . In
autarky, the South has a lower capital stock and safety levels are lower as well. For simplicity
and without losing any insights, we consider the southern safety level to be exogenous. As
the law of one price holds without barriers to trade, the single determinant for capital ￿ ows
are international di⁄erences in the marginal product of capital. Using technology (6) and the








As it is clear from (12), OHS standards s have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the interest rate: If the
safety level is too low, capital owners are in favour of more safety since they see the overall
positive e⁄ect of healthier workers. Again, however, if s is too high, the TFP-reducing e⁄ect
is stronger than the labour-supply e⁄ect.
21Allowing now for international capital ￿ ows and denoting North-South ￿ ows by ￿, equi-
librium on the world capital market requires equality of the factor rewards for capital,
r(s;K ￿ ￿) = r(s
￿;K
￿ + ￿); (25)
where an asterisk denotes southern quantities.18 This equation determines ￿; given autarky
endowments K and K￿, an exogenous southern safety level s￿ and the endogenous safety
level s in the North. The latter continues to be determined by unions in the North. When
looking at optimality conditions for the ￿rm-level union in (13) or the confederation equation
(14) closely, we see that the capital stock is taken as parametric by the union. In a closed
economy setup this de￿nitely makes sense for the confederation as K is exogenous in our
static model. For a ￿rm-level union, the capital stock k is endogenous and the union could
take into account how setting s a⁄ects the capital stock in a ￿rm. Similar considerations
could be undertaken by unions in a global world. Very sophisticated unions would take into
account that setting safety standards has an e⁄ect on the capital stock in a country or, put
di⁄erently, on capital in- or out￿ ows. As we want to use the results from our closed economy
analysis for the two-country world, we assume that unions continue to take the capital stock
as parametric. Hence, the equation which ￿xes the endogenous OHS level s in the North is
either (13) or (14). An equilibrium in our setup is therefore given by (25) and (13) or by (25)
and (14). In both cases, two equations determine two endogenous variables: capital ￿ ows ￿
from North to South and safety levels s in the North.
As the discussion of (22) has shown, the impact of union behaviour depends strongly on
how ￿comprehensive￿their view and level of in￿ uence is. We can therefore conveniently con-
sider ￿rm and nation-wide unions as polar cases. To obtain clear-cut results when discussing
the e⁄ects of OHS on capital ￿ ows and vice versa, we will assume that the safety level set
by unions lies below the social welfare-maximizing level sU (see ￿g. 1). Sometimes we also
discuss situations where it is below the interest rate maximizing level sR. Once these results
are understood, the impact of unions more closer to the polar cases will be clear as well.
The equilibrium on capital markets is plotted in ￿g. 2. The horizontal axis shows the
northern capital stock from the left and the southern from the right such that the total length
of the horizontal axis re￿ ects world endowment with capital, K + K￿. The vertical axis on
the left shows the northern interest rate, the one on the right the interest rate in the South.
Capital demand curves plot loci which give the interest rate as a function of capital used in
the North and South, respectively.
￿ Capital ￿ ows
Thinking of a scenario where countries are in autarky and then open up for capital ￿ ows,
let us assume ￿rst that countries in autarky di⁄er only in their capital stock. There are no
18Maybe one should not talk about ￿ ows in a static model. Strictly speaking, ￿ is the stock of capital
installed in the South but owned by the North.
22union activities and safety levels are identical and low. When the initial capital endowment
before capital ￿ ows is given as drawn in ￿g. 2, factor rewards in the South at S1 are higher
than in the North at N1. With free capital ￿ ows, the new world-equilibrium point is at W1
where capital ￿ ows from the North to the South of a total volume of ￿1 imply an equalisation
























Figure 2 Autarky equilibria Ni and Si and world equilibria Wi with free capital ￿ows
Are capital ￿ ows from the North to the South a realistic description of reality? It is well-
known that the US as one of the richest countries in the world is one of the biggest recipient of
foreign investments. When capital ￿ ows of ￿all￿countries in the world are analysed, capital
￿ ows from the North to the South from the 70s to the mid 80s to reverse subsequently and
to ￿ ow South to North from the end of the 90s (Prasad et al., 2006, chart 2). If the focus is
on FDI, however, capital always ￿ ows from North to South (chart 4). If the world without
US is analysed, capital also ￿ ows from North to South (chart 3). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006, ￿g. 9) make a similar point: Net foreign assets (i.e. accumulated ￿ ows) are positive
for industrialized countries and negative for the US and emerging and developing countries.
Capital ￿ ows from North to South are therefore a realistic view of the world if the focus is
on FDI (which comes the closest to our capital stock K in this long-run static equilibrium)
or if the focus is on industrialized countries other than the US.19
19If one focuses on gross ￿ ows, it is even more apparent that North-South ￿ ows are very relevant. Capital
out￿ ows from the US from 1960 to 2007 are on average 3.8 times higher than (absolute) net ￿ ows (BEA,
2008).
23Second, if we introduce trade unions in the North, the autarky safety level is higher
than without unions. Let us assume this OHS level is constant (e.g. institutions have CD
preferences, see ￿ = 0 in (23)). As long as this OHS level is not beyond the capital-return
maximizing point (i.e. as long as sv < sR), the capital demand function moves up from r1
to r2. As discussed around (22), capital owners are actually in favour of higher safety levels
as long as this has a positive e⁄ect on capital rewards. Starting with the same initial capital
distribution, the starting points are now S1 and N2 and the new world-equilibrium point is
W2: Capital ￿ ows from the North to the South are now lower and amount to ￿2 only. Higher
(but not too high) safety levels reduce capital out￿ ows.
When we return to the realistic situation in (23) where health and income are bad substi-
tutes (￿ < 0), safety standards fall after capital out￿ ows. Starting from N2 and S1 as before,
capital out￿ ows will lead to a ￿temporary￿equilibrium at W2: Falling OHS levels reduce the
northern capital demand function to r3 and the ￿nal equilibrium point is W3: Capital out￿ ows
are larger due to the fall in OHS levels in the North but still lower than under a situation
without any northern OHS standards. Generally speaking, this contradicts the often stated
view that capital ￿ ows to where standards are lower. If standards are so low that marginal
productivity of capital su⁄ers, capital will stay in the North.
4.2 Capital ￿ ows and welfare
Let us now turn to the welfare e⁄ects of international capital ￿ ows. Welfare in both countries
by (7) is a function of consumption and health. In the North, endogenous OHS standards
s and therefore health are a function of capital ￿ ows, z (￿) = z (s(K ￿ ￿)). In the South,
health z￿ (s￿) is exogenous due to exogenous safety levels s￿. Consumption in the North is
given by domestic production (6) plus capital income from abroad, Y + r￿￿, while in the
South it is domestic production minus capital income paid to foreign capital owners in the
North, Y ￿ ￿ r￿￿. Making the dependence of consumption on capital ￿ ows ￿ explicit,
C = Y (A(s(K ￿ ￿));K ￿ ￿;z (s(K ￿ ￿))N) + r
￿ (K











￿ + ￿)￿; (27)
we see that capital ￿ ows ￿ a⁄ect the northern consumption level through TFP, the capital
stock, labour supply and the northern interest income. For the South, only the southern
capital stock and the interest payments are a⁄ected. Computing the welfare e⁄ects of capital



















￿￿ > 0; (29)
24where again subscripts denote partial derivatives: e.g. r￿
￿ is the change in the southern
interest rate due to capital in￿ ow into the South.
Capital ￿ ows in￿ uence northern welfare through the ￿classic channel￿ , the ￿e¢ ciency
channel￿ and the ￿health channel￿ . The ￿rst term in (28) starting with UC is the classic
channel which says that if the southern interest rate r￿ does not react to capital ￿ ows from
the North (that is, if r￿
￿￿ = 0), there are welfare gains as long as the foreign interest rate
is larger than the domestic one (r￿ > r). This is the well-known condition for gains from
capital mobility. However, if a sizable amount of capital has already ￿ own and the southern
interest rate falls when more capital ￿ ows (that is, if r￿
￿￿ < 0), there might not be gains
from additional capital ￿ ows. In fact, in a two-country world, welfare-maximizing capital
￿ ows should stop before the domestic interest rate equals the foreign one.20 As the gains
from higher capital rewards abroad overcompensate the losses from the fall in the foreign
capital rewards when capital ￿ ows just start, we conclude that overall there are gains from
international capital ￿ ows.
The second term, UCYs@s=@￿, can be called the ￿e¢ ciency channel￿and might be best
understood with the help of ￿g. 1. If the planner in the North maximized output and set
OHS standards equal to sY, this term would be zero, Ys = YAAs + YLzsN = 0. The negative
TFP e⁄ects of safety (the expression YAAs) would just be compensated by the positive labour
supply e⁄ect YLzsN. If, however, OHS standards were below the output-maximizing safety
sY, that is if Ys > 0, and noting that an out￿ ow of capital reduces the safety level (@s=@￿ < 0,
see (23)), a further reduction of s due to capital out￿ ows would increase ine¢ ciencies in the
North and thereby reduce output.
The ￿nal term in (28) Uzzs@s=@￿ is more related to trade unions and their impact on
higher OHS standards. The closer the union-set safety level is to the social welfare-maximizing
level sU, the higher the social welfare is. If the union safety level is lower than sU, that is, if
Uz > 0, any reduction in safety (due to capital out￿ ows) reduces welfare. Consequently, the
welfare e⁄ect of reduced OHS standards is negative.
Combining all three channels, capital ￿ ows increase northern welfare due to a more e¢ cient
factor allocation but reduce welfare since less capital implies lower OHS standards which were
too low already before capital ￿ ows. This reduction has a negative e⁄ect on e¢ ciency and
on health per se. Welfare gains through capital ￿ ows are therefore reduced by negative OHS
e⁄ects.21
For the South, however, the welfare e⁄ects are unambiguously positive. For each unit of
capital ￿ owing into the country, it pays the local marginal product. Hence, the term r ￿ r￿
we see in (28) is zero in (29). It bene￿ts, however, from the reduction of the domestic interest
20This e⁄ect must be known from the literature on international factor ￿ ows in two-country worlds or in
the case of large (i.e. not small) open economies. So far, however, we have been unable to ￿nd a reference.
We are grateful to Juergen Meckl for discussion of this point.
21Clearly, if one believes that OHS standards are excessive, i.e. above sU; capital out￿ ows implying a
reduction of safety levels would imply welfare gains due to capital ￿ ows per se and due to reduced OHS
standards.
25rate due to in￿ ows, r￿
￿ < 0. There is no health channel as safety standards are invariant.
5 Trade unions go global!
This section is motivated by the general discussion about the desirability of trade unions and
their role in a global world. Given competition between the North and the South, can the
North a⁄ord to have ￿old-fashioned￿institutions like trade unions? Do not ￿modern global
times￿require to abolish unions such as to make a country more ￿competitive￿ ? Or should
governments rather encourage activities of trade unions also in the South?
In order to address these questions, we now ask how the results obtained so far are a⁄ected
if trade unions are also introduced in the South. What are the welfare consequences for the
North, the South, and the world economy and how would northern trade unions react to this?
5.1 International capital ￿ ows and OHS
We stipulate that an increased presence of trade unions in the South would increase southern
safety levels. If we assume that this new safety is still lower than the interest-maximizing
southern safety (that is, if s￿ < sR￿), an increase in the southern safety level will increase the
capital demand curve from r￿
1 to r￿
2 (see ￿g. 2). Capital owners are better o⁄. Of course the
question arises why it takes trade unions to help capital owners to increase their returns to
investment. The answer is simple, however: In a society with few economic institutions and
no well-functioning ￿nancial systems, each capital owner is basically an entrepreneur who
owns his own ￿rm. OHS standards imply costs but there are no institutions which would
allow capital owners to coordinate their activities and credibly jointly increase the safety
level. Firms are caught in a prisoners￿dilemma. The need for higher safety levels is more
pressing for workers as they are physically a⁄ected through negative health e⁄ects. Hence,
even though each individual ￿rm in the South will be opposed to higher OHS standards,
capital owners as a group will gain.
For an invariant safety level in the North (the CD case with ￿ = 0 in (23)), this implies
that the equilibrium moves from W2 to W4 and the ￿ ow of capital to the South increases from
￿2 to ￿4. For the bad-substitution CES case (￿ < 0), capital out￿ ows to the South reduce
safety levels in the North. If safety levels were below the interest rate maximizing level sR,
capital demand in the North would be reduced from r3 to r4 and the equilibrium would move
from W3 to W5. Capital out￿ ows from the North would increase from ￿3 to ￿5.
At ￿rst sight it might be surprising that an introduction of trade unions in the South
can increase capital in￿ ows to this country. But, if TFP losses are not too strong, northern
investors simply pro￿t form a healthier labour force in the South. This idea is supported by
Alsan et al. (2006) who ￿nd empirical evidence that an improvement in a population￿ s health
increases gross FDI in￿ ows to low- and middle-income countries. If trade unions can play
26a similar role in the South today as they played historically in nowadays OECD countries,
trade unions are good for health and growth of a developing country.
5.2 Global unions and welfare
￿ The North and the South
What are the welfare implications if trade unions in the South increase the southern safety
























These conditions look similar to those in (28) and (29) where the e⁄ects of capital ￿ ows were
analysed. In fact, term one in (30) corresponds to the classic channel above. In contrast to
above, however, we start from an integrated world economy with r = r￿ and capital ￿ ows are
now induced by changes in southern OHS standards s￿. However, this term is now positive
since we are making the plausible assumption that the southern safety level s￿ is lower than
the interest-maximizing safety level sR￿. The second term is the e¢ ciency channel and the
third term is the direct health channel. More safety in the South has a positive e⁄ect on
interest payments but reduces output and the health level in the North.
We saw above that capital ￿ ows increase northern welfare but falling OHS standards can
reduce these welfare gains. What remains here on balance? First of all, an increase in southern
safety increases interest rates paid on previous investments ￿ since r￿
s￿ > 0. As opposed to
(28), the classic channel leads here to gains for the North: Higher s￿ increases returns for
investors as higher labour supply in the South increases marginal productivities of capital
in the South (by more than lower southern TFP would reduce it). The second, e¢ ciency,
channel is negative if the safety level in the North is below its output-maximizing level (i.e.
Ys > 0) and if more safety in the south implies capital out￿ ows from the north and thereby
a reduction of safety levels in the North, i.e. @s=@s￿ < 0. The third channel does not bring
good news for the North either: If OHS standards s and thereby the average health level fall,
welfare goes down through this health channel as well.
For the South, two new terms as compared to (29) appear. The second and third term can
easily be identi￿ed as the e¢ ciency and health channels in the South. Term one is negative;
terms two and three are positive: The South looses from higher interest payments to the
North but gains from e¢ ciency gains in production due to higher OHS standards and from
health per se.
27￿ The con￿ ict between northern and southern unions
There are numerous examples in the media where northern trade unions help establish
southern unions. One often mentioned reason is that unions in the South increase southern
wages which reduces low-wage competition in the North. Looking at trade union cooperation
in more detail, however, quite some authors have suggested that international cooperation has
been rather marginal (see, for example, Northrup and Rowan (1979), Enderwick (1985), pp.
147-154, and the references therein, and Gordon and Turner (2000)). Our model suggests one
possible reason why there is actually a con￿ ict between northern and southern unions. Both
unions bene￿t from capital ￿ ows. More capital means higher wages and, as a consequence,
higher safety levels. Both enter the objective function of unions positively. Building up a
union in the South implying higher safety levels results in a capital out￿ ow and northern
union members lose.
￿ The world as a whole
What should we now conclude from these ambiguous results for global activities of unions?
The North tends to lose, northern unions are de￿nitely worse o⁄ and only the South seems
to gain from higher OHS standards in the South. Should trade unions go global?
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Table 2 Calibrating the free capital ￿ow equilibrium
a: normalized to one
b: ratio of population of China and India to population of G7 countries in 200622
We can make an argument in favour of more global activities of trade unions by looking
at trade union e⁄ects quantitatively. In the European Union, 2% of working days are lost
due to health issues related to work (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007, Table 7.3), i.e. z (s) = :98.
Taking into account that accident rates in non-industrialized countries are 4 to 6 times higher
than in industrialized countries (H￿m￿l￿inen et al., 2006), the absence rate due to health is,
say, 10% in the South (z￿ = :9). We start from a free-capital ￿ ow equilibrium given by (25)
and (13). We assume a CES utility function as in (16) such that the optimal ￿rm-level union
safety level is implicitly given by (c) from tab. 1. We want this initial equilibrium to re￿ ect
health levels z and GDP per capita broadly consistent with the average G7 country for the
28North and the population-weighted mean of China and India for the South (see tab. 2).22
We can then analyse the e⁄ect of an increase of the safety level in the South which decreases
absence rates in the South from 10% to 2%.
Some of our parameters are purely exogenous and we ￿do not touch them￿for our analysis.
These parameters appear in the upper left corner of tab. 2. Robustness analysis has shown
that modifying them does not a⁄ect the basic quantitative result reported below. Endogenous
quantities which need to be matched are shown in the upper right part. In addition to health
and GDP, we also need to make sure that our endogenous health level z (s) implies a safety
level below the output and interest rate maximizing level sY; i.e. z
￿
sY￿
￿ z (s): This makes
the quantitative analysis consistent with our discussion of safety rankings in (22). We also
require the interest rate to be in a plausible range.
The parameters used to obtain the to-be-matched quantities are shown in the lower left
corner. All of these values are in the range one would expect. Relative TFP between the
North and South implied by b and b￿ (compare (21) for the link between b and TFP), is maybe
a bit larger than usual; if di⁄erences in education and experience levels between workers in
the North and South is taken into consideration, however, relative TFP would go down and
become closer to standard ratios. The parameter with a relatively high value is ￿; the weight
attached by unions to labour income. Such a high value is required, however, simply to
make sure that z
￿
sY￿
> :98. Remember that we consider the ￿rm-level union as one polar
case as opposed to the sector- or economy-wide union. The calibration analysis could also
have used a weighted mean of sv and sV and no such extreme value for ￿ would have been
required.23 The world capital stock is a pure shift parameter a⁄ecting the equilibrium interest
rate. By modifying K + K￿; any desired interest rate can be obtained. As capital ￿ ows and
health e⁄ects are not sensitive to the interest rate, K + K￿ was set to 300. In the resulting
equilibrium, 84.3% of the world capital stock is used in the North.
Starting from this equilibrium, we increase the Southern level z￿ from .9 to the Northern
level of .98. The implied capital ￿ ows from the North to the South constitute the ￿real
test￿for our calibration as these ￿ ows should be consistent with the estimates of Alsan et
al. (2006). They ￿nd that every additional year of life expectancy implies a 9% increase in
FDI in￿ ows to low- and middle-income countries. Average life expectancy in their sample
is 64.6 years, i.e. one can translate an additional year into a 100/65%￿1.5% increase in
hours worked. Increasing hours worked from 90% to 98% is an increase of approx. 9% (not
percentage points), i.e. an increase of 9=1:5 = 6 additional years in life expectancy. Such
a change should imply an increase of in￿ ows of 6*9%=54%. As 1$ of in￿ ows amounts to
an increase of domestic investment of 1$ (on the aggregate level, see Desai et al., 2005) and
investment to capital stock ratios are around 10%, a 54% increase in in￿ ows implies a 5.4%
increase in the capital stock. We ￿nd that our capital ￿ ows amount to a 6.7% increase in the
22All nominal data is in 2006 PPP US$. All data is taken from World Bank (2008).
23Understanding why a high ￿ implies a high z (s) is di¢ cult as this mechanism acts through the calibration.
Parameters like b and ￿ are endogenous and some variables are exogenous.
29southern capital stock, i.e. they are very consistent with the ￿ndings of Alsan et al.
Given these satisfactory quantitative properties of our model, we will now use it to predict
GDP and health e⁄ects. International capital ￿ ows imply a decrease of safety levels s in the
North which imply that the share z (s) of time individuals are healthy decreases by 0.008%.
GDP in the North decreases by 0.4% and increases in the South by 7.6% implying an increase
of world GDP by .8%. Put di⁄erently, southern unions have a theoretical but not a practical
negative e⁄ect of work standards in the North. Higher southern standards do, however,
reduce domestic production in the North by a small amount but increases southern production
considerably, leading overall to an increase in world output.
6 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the belief that an institution like trade unions which has
been around for more than a century and is active in almost all countries in the world can not
only be detrimental to economic production and welfare of a society. Studying activities of
workers￿associations and trade unions beyond wage negotiation has shown that trade unions
play a major role in providing workplace safety - at least in providing information about the
necessity of measures that assure occupational health and safety (OHS). Trade unions did
perform this role historically in nowadays OECD countries and do play such a role today in
certain industrializing economies.
The ￿rst central question of this paper is whether these OHS activities of unions can
assign unions an output and welfare increasing role. Our analysis has shown that output and
welfare e⁄ects of unions depend on union objectives and, more importantly, on the degree
of centralization in an economy. Firm-level unions set lower OHS standards than economy-
wide unions as the former neglect the positive labour supply e⁄ect of higher OHS. Firm-level
unions are just as short-sighted (i.e. focused on this one ￿rm) as ￿rms and treat employment
as the outcome of labour demand decisions by the ￿rm. They provide OHS only as they value
health of their members per se. Economy-wide unions fully internalize the positive labour
supply e⁄ect due to more OHS and therefore set higher safety standards. In fact, ruling out
distributional e⁄ects from variations in the size of the labour force (i.e. assuming a Cobb-
Douglas technology), economy-wide unions which attach the same importance to health as
society as a whole set the social welfare-maximizing OHS standards. Even with a ￿rm-level
union, output and welfare increases compared to a laissez-faire economy.
Can other institutions play a similar role as unions do? We have seen that capital owners -
as opposed to individual atomistic ￿rms - would also internalize economy-wide labour supply
e⁄ects and value health of workers. Capital owners trying to maximize their revenue would
increase overall output and welfare of an economy as compared to a laissez-faire economy
but never up to the social welfare-maximizing point. The incentives for capital owners to
form a coalition and internalize the negative health externality, however, are much lower than
for workers. Capital owners ￿do not feel health hazards￿ . It is only the workers who are
30directly confronted with risk at work. Hence, workers￿associations are the most probable
institution to initially play this output and welfare increasing role. After some time, when
general awareness in society about OHS standards or particular health issues has grown, the
role of trade unions can be taken over by society as a whole, i.e. by some voting process
through a government. This might be the reason why in the US, UK, Germany and many
other OECD countries, governmental agencies nowadays take care of OHS standards and
provide various types of work and health related insurances - and partly make them even
compulsory.
The second central question of our paper is the role unions can play in a global world.
What happens to international capital ￿ ows when unions are active in the North and OHS
standards are high but unions are absent in the South? It depends. If unions in the North are
moderate, capital ￿ ows to the South will be reduced as some health level is better than none
and marginal productivities of capital are higher with unions. Clearly, if unions put a lot of
emphasis on health or even when the social planner maximizes welfare, some capital will be
driven out of the country due to high OHS standards - but still less than in a laissez-faire
economy.
When unions become active in the South, output in the world as a whole will rise and so
will welfare. There are strong distributional e⁄ects and the North might lose, as will unions
in the North. A quantitative analysis has shown, however, that for the world as a whole
higher OHS standards in the South increase output. These distributional e⁄ects point to the
potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects of side payments from unions in the South to unions in the North.
If this cooperation can be achieved, Pareto gains from globalization should be possible.
The paper has various shortcomings which can be overcome in future work. Can unions
play a role in industrialized countries today where OHS standards are set by government
agencies? One would have to start with an analysis where some ￿rms or sectors are unionized
while others are not. A partial unionization would also be useful to understand the e⁄ects of
unions in the South better. Any increasing role would come gradually and unions would not
become monopoly unions instantaneously. Second, the assumption of ignorance on the side of
workers and perfect information of unions can be replaced by a Bayesian learning approach.
One can expect that the relative degree of risk-aversion of workers (with respect to labour
income relative to health e⁄ects) will determine whether ￿optimistic￿workers (their prior pre-
dicts a higher expected share of time being healthy than a certain job actually implies) accept
higher or lower wages than the perfect information compensating di⁄erential wage. One can
then also analyse precisely the incentives for workers to join a union (thereby also capturing
the fact that no real-world economy is 100% unionized) and understand how joint learning
increases welfare. Third, one can undertake a more systematic quantitative historical analy-
sis of unions across sectors or countries. The evidence presented in the introduction suggests
that in countries where workers were allowed to form unions developed stronger welfare states
than countries where unions were suppressed. Is it true - beyond simple examples from some
countries - that the share of organized labour say ￿a decade after￿the industrial revolution is
31a good predictor for the ￿size￿of the welfare state some 100 years later? All these extensions
would allow to understand better to what extent joint action and cooperative behaviour -
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